SHORT ESSAY ON THE NOTION OF GENERAL INTEREST IN ARTICLE 982 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC OR JE PUISE MAIS N’ÉPUISE

Robert P. Godin

There is a beautiful stained glass window located in the library of the National Assembly of Québec showing a young person drawing water from a stream, that has a most appropriate title referring in a very subtle way to the fact that all the knowledge and information contained in the library is easily accessible and can be drawn upon without impairing its existence: “Je puise mais n’épuise,” a literal translation of which could be “I do not deplete the source I draw upon.”

The concept expressed in this image is appropriate to the many aspects of the current discourse with respect to water resources. It also serves to better illustrate the Legislature’s intention in qualifying the import of Article 982 of the Civil Code of Québec (C.C.Q.) with the notion of general interest.

* Editor’s Note: Citations herein generally conform to THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005). In order to make the citations more useful for Canadian practitioners, abbreviations and certain other conventions have been adopted from the CANADIAN GUIDE TO UNIFORM LEGAL CITATION [Manuel Canadien de la Référence Juridique] (McGill Law Journal eds., 4th ed. [Revue du droit de McGill, 4e éd.] 1998).

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INTRODUCTION

I propose to share a few reflections concerning a very interesting provision of the C.C.Q., Article 982, which reads:

Unless it is contrary to the general interest, a person having a right to use a spring, lake, sheet of water, underground stream or any running water may, to prevent the water from being polluted or used up, require the destruction or modification of any works by which the water is being polluted or dried up.

À moins que cela ne soit contraire à l’intérêt général, celui qui a droit à l’usage d’une source, d’un lac, d’une nappe d’eau ou d’une rivière souterraine, ou d’une eau courante, peut, de façon à éviter la pollution ou l’épuisement de l’eau, exiger la destruction ou la modification de tout ouvrage qui pollue ou épuise l’eau.¹

Even though there are minor discrepancies between the English and French, the reader should be reminded that under Québec law the two versions of the Civil Code have absolutely equal standing.²

The original Civil Code of Lower Canada was adopted in 1866, one year before Confederation, to reflect generally what was considered to be the private law in Québec at the time. The basic structure of the Code, together with a very significant number of its provisions, was based on the Napoleonic Code adopted in France in 1804. Over time, very few amendments were made to the Code of 1866, but in 1955 a political decision was made to proceed with a complete revision of the old Code.

2. For instance, see Doré v. Verdun, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, ¶²³–²⁴. There, the court stated: [A]ppellant is relying on an interpretation principle applicable to bilingual statutes, namely that they should be interpreted by finding the meaning shared by both versions, that is “the more narrow of the two” meanings (P.-A. Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (2nd ed. 1991), at p. 276)

This argument was rejected by Baudouin J.A. in the judgment under appeal, partly on the basis that the English version of the Civil Code is [translation] “merely a translation of the original French version” (p. 1327). With respect, although what he stated is unfortunately true, it cannot be used to reject the argument made by the appellant. Section 7 of the Charter of the French language, R.S.Q., c. C-11, provides that the French and English versions of Quebec statutes “are equally authoritative”. This is in accordance with s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 which requires that the statutes of the legislature of Quebec be enacted in both official languages and that both versions be equally authoritative and have the same status (see: Attorney General of Quebec v. Blaikie, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016; Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721).

Id.
The process of revision was a long and difficult one, and it ultimately came to fruition on December 18, 1991 with the adoption of a new Code, known as the Civil Code of Québec. The C.C.Q. came into force on January 1, 1994.

Article 982 of the C.C.Q. is an altogether new provision, in that there was no corresponding or even similar stipulation in the Civil Code of Lower Canada of 1866. The concepts expressed in Article 982 are completely new to the C.C.Q. and have therefore been the subject of few judicial pronouncements. In fact, Article 982 of the C.C.Q. could be said to reflect the developing concerns of the Québec Legislature during the 1980s.

As part of the reform process, a Commentary was prepared by the Minister of Justice to set forth the origins and briefly explain each article.

With respect to Article 982 of the C.C.Q., the Commentary of the Minister of Justice is to the following effect:

[Author’s Translation] This article is new. It follows the philosophy set forth in Article 981 restricting the absolute right over water, particularly by requiring that the right to demand the destruction or the modification of any work can only be exercised if it is not contrary to the general interest.

Water must be considered as a thing subject to common use and rules must be enacted to preserve the quality of this water and also the right of use of other owners.

The Environment Quality Act (Q-2) and the Mining Act (M-13.1), together with the regulations adopted thereunder, contain a number of provisions that already limit the rights of an owner in this respect.

I find this statement by the Minister to be quite ambiguous in that the Legislature’s priorities seem divided. This Commentary seems to assert that a user of water can seek redress under this provision only if the general interest is not adversely affected in the process. If the polluter is found to be otherwise acting in the general interest, then the user, whose water “is

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3. See Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, Art. 981, which states:
A riparian owner may, for his needs, make use of a lake, the headwaters of a watercourse or any watercourse bordering or crossing his land. As the water leaves his land, he shall direct it, not substantially changed in quality or quantity, into its regular course. No riparian owner may by his use of the water prevent other riparian owners from exercising the same right.
Id. (emphasis added).

being used up or polluted[,]"\(^5\) has no recourse under this article. That appears to be the logical implication of the first paragraph. Yet, the second paragraph refers to water as “a thing subject to common use”\(^6\) and therefore entitled to preservation and protection, an objective that may or may not be in accord with a narrow view of what constitutes the general interest. Furthermore, the oblique reference to public law statutes (i.e. the Environment Quality Act,\(^7\) the Mining Act,\(^8\) and others not mentioned such as the Watercourses Act,\(^9\) and An Act to Affirm the Collective Nature of Water Resources and Provide for Increased Water Resource Protection\(^10\)) points to statutory legislation that does, in fact, contain provisions dealing with the use and protection of water. Yet, it is unclear what the intent of the Legislature could be in cases of conflict between the different sources of legislation (private and public).

The Commentaries of the Minister do not, in general, have a determining effect on the interpretation and application of particular provisions of the C.C.Q. by the courts. But they are one of the preferred sources to which a jurist can resort in the process of determining the scope and meaning of a particular article.\(^11\)

In this case, the Commentary would probably be given serious attention by our judges in their attempt to discern the actual intent of the legislator.

I. ARTICLE 982 OF THE C.C.Q.

Let us return to the actual wording of the Article. There are a number of significant elements in this provision, and, as is generally the case in matters involving a civil code, there are no statutory definitions to draw

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6. Id.

Of course, the interpretation of the Civil Code must be based first and foremost on the wording of its provisions. That said, however, and as noted by Baudouin J.A. in the judgment under appeal, there is no reason to systematically disregard the Minister’s commentaries, since they can sometimes be helpful in determining the legislature’s intention, especially where the wording of the article is open to differing interpretations (at p. 1327). However, the commentaries are not an absolute authority. They are not binding on the courts, and their weight can vary, inter alia in light of other factors that may assist in interpreting the Civil Code’s provisions.

Id.
upon when the time comes to determine the scope and actual import of a particular article.

I will generally restrict my comments to attempting to define what meaning can be given to the notion of “general interest” as is used in Article 982 of the C.C.Q. Bear in mind that there are other aspects of this provision that are worthy of consideration,\textsuperscript{12} such as the determination of \textit{who} can avail himself/herself of this provision (\textit{a person}); the nature of the right (interest) linking this person to a specific source water (\textit{a right to use}); the forms in which \textit{water} can be found for the purposes of this Article; the degree of \textit{pollution or overuse} that a court would consider sufficiently serious; and the rules with respect to the \textit{destruction or modification} of offending \textit{works}. These considerations will be left for another day!

II. GENERAL CONTEXT

Article 982 of the C.C.Q. is located in Book Four–Property, Title 2–Ownership, Chapter III–Special Rules on the Ownership of Immovables, Section III–Water.

The introductory article to Chapter III is Article 976, which is at once a “stand alone” provision and one that is also designed to have a direct influence on the interpretation of the whole of Chapter III of which Article 982 forms a part: “Neighbours shall suffer the normal neighbourhood annoyances that are not beyond the limit of tolerance they owe each other, according to the nature or location of their land or local custom.”\textsuperscript{13} We will not consider here the full meaning and implications of this very laconic provision, other than to say that it is one of the basic legal provisions relating to a very complex and interesting area—the relationship between neighbours.

One of the key concepts flowing from Article 976 is the notion of \textit{tolerance}. In considering the tests or criteria that will determine the application of the recourse set forth in Article 982, the level of \textit{tolerance} that neighbours owe each other would have to be taken into account.\textsuperscript{14}

\begin{footnotes}
12. \textit{See Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, Art. 982.} The Article states: Unless it is contrary to the general interest, a person having a right to use a spring, lake, sheet of water, underground stream or any running water may, to prevent the water from being polluted or used up, require the destruction or modification of any works by which the water is being polluted or dried up.

\textit{Id.}


14. QUEBEC, MINISTERE DE LA JUSTICE, \textit{supra} note 4, at 573. The Commentary explains: [Author’s Translation] With respect to the Chapter dealing with the \textit{Special rules on the ownership of immovables}, the Code sets forth, as a first principle, the notion that neighbours must accept the normal “neighbourhood annoyances” that
\end{footnotes}
Moreover, while there may have been doubts lingering in the minds of members of the legal community as to the necessity of basing recourse under Article 976 on the notion of fault, this question was resolved by the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada in the fall of 2008 in a unanimous decision that clearly and unequivocally confirmed that fault is not a necessary ingredient in determining liability under Article 976. Similarly, fault should not be a required ingredient under Article 982.

III. THE “GENERAL INTEREST”

A. Importance

Clearly, the question we must address is the meaning of the expression regarding general interest since this concept determines whether or not this provision of law will be applicable in a given situation or not. It reads, “Unless it is contrary to the general interest (À moins que cela ne soit contraire à l’intérêt général).”

This expression is not defined in the Civil Code itself, and there are no statutory definitions otherwise available.

In a short article published in 1992 (after the adoption of the new Civil Code but before its coming into force), Charlotte Lemieux, professor at...
the Law Faculty of the University of Sherbrooke, proposed a critical analysis of Article 982 and, with respect to the notion of general interest, made the following observation:

[Author’s Translation] The ‘general interest’ that will allow one to set aside the recourse available under Article 982 C.C.Q. remains to be defined, yet as it is a nebulous, elastic, variable, and mobile concept, subject to social, economic, and cultural considerations, its definition will be problematic.\(^{20}\)

Certainly, at first glance and as Professor Lemieux points out, Article 982 constitutes the clear expression of a restriction on the absolute nature of the right of ownership with respect to water. The Minister, in his Commentary, refers to the fact that Article 982 is an extension of the principle laid out in Article 981, which clearly provides that a riparian owner only enjoys a very limited right of use with regard to any water bordering or crossing his or her land: “As the water leaves his land, he shall direct it, not substantially changed in quality or quantity, into its regular course. . . . No riparian owner may by his use of the water prevent other riparian owners from exercising the same rights.”\(^{21}\)

A riparian owner cannot appropriate the water temporarily located on his/her land in a way that would modify the quality or quantity of the water as it flows downstream and, in any event, cannot act in a way that would prevent other riparian owners from exercising the same rights. The rule is clear and seems imminently fair and equitable.

But Article 982 seems to have two somewhat contradictory effects: First, with respect to the person “having a right to use water,” the right given under Article 982 can never be absolute since it is necessarily limited by any imperatives relating to general interest (which would have to include a reference to the notion of “tolerance” mentioned previously), “unless it is contrary to the general interest . . . .”\(^{22}\) If it is, the right to seek the remedy provided in Article 982 is set aside altogether.

And second, with respect to the works “by which the water is being polluted or dried up,”\(^{23}\) such works could be required to be destroyed or
modified unless their existence and continued maintenance is shown to be in the general interest.

So then, what is this general interest? Clearly, the concept is fundamentally important to the understanding of Article 982. By its terms, the import of this article extends beyond the immediate relationship between neighbours, which is generally based on the concepts of proximity and reciprocity. Here, general interest refers to a level of concern that reaches beyond the immediate interests of contiguous neighbours. Other considerations include community interests, economic interests, employment, fiscal considerations, environmental concerns—e.g., the preservation of water as a resource to be protected and shared, and the protection of special habitats. In each particular case, general interest will have to be defined and established by a judge hearing the case.

B. Definitions

How can we define general interest? Strangely enough, it is not easy to find a useful definition of this expression. The Private Law Dictionary, published by the Québec Research Centre of Private & Comparative Law at the McGill Law Faculty, defines general interest as “that which is to the advantage of all.”24 Gérard Cornu, in his Vocabulaire juridique, published under the auspices of the Association Henri Capitant,25 proposes that the term be defined as “Ce qui est pour le bien public; à l’avantage de tous” (that which is in the public good, to the advantage of all). It is conceivable that a judge sitting in a complex case involving an action under Article 982, however, would not find these definitions very helpful.

C. Two approaches to the determination of “general interest”

Cursory research on this question has indicated that, as so often happens, the expression is used as though its meaning were obvious and generally known, with no further inquiry as to its scope. It is also often stated to be synonymous with the expression common good.

In a recent article published in Québec, L’intérêt général et les notions voisines, French author François Rangeon26 proposes two possible definitions of general interest. The first reflects a more traditional

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25. GERARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE (7th ed. 2005).
viewpoint and defines *general interest* by reference to existing legislation. According to this view, the legislature represents the democratic embodiment of the people’s wishes and is therefore the true expression of *general interest* through the legislative process. The second approach reflects an expression of the changing times in which we live. It refers to a more dynamic and fragmented process whereby the active members of a given modern society, after extensive interaction, achieve some form of consensus that becomes the then-prevailing expression of what constitutes *general interest* at that time.

[Author’s Translation] General interest and common good have distinct semantic histories. The notion of common good has a theological basis—it was conceptualized in the 13th century by Saint Thomas Aquinas—and it incorporates a forcefully moral dimension, through which it is akin to ideas of justice and virtue. General interest originated in the 18th century, and its history is intimately linked to the emergence of the modern State. General interest can thus be seen as the secularization, rationalization and appropriation by the state of the concept of common good. Its dominant thrust is at once legal and political.

General interest has first of all become very complex, both in terms of its conceptual content and in terms of the facets by which it manifests itself. General interest now incorporates contradictory principles (individual freedom and solidarity, enshrined personal rights and their regulation within society). It is no longer granted acceptance as an *a priori* factor that public officials impose upon the society they represent, but is born instead of a long process of consultation by which specific interests are weighed, rather than opposed. The result is a collaboration between public powers, market forces and societal values. Any socio-historical construct allaying general interest with State interest or public policy appears to have imploded. What may have once been a State monopoly on the notion of general interest has been subjected to an array of diverse pressures, such as globalization, crises of confidence with regards to State power and its political brokers, a rise in democratically defined aspirations, as well as territorial re-mappings within States. Ultimately, a principle according to which the State should define general interest will have become obsolete, or at the very least, deeply controversial.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{27.} \textit{Id.}
This second view, it would seem, is closer to what is happening now in our societies. It is one that our judges will increasingly be called upon to take into account in determining what, in a given situation, constitutes the general interest. This viewpoint also allows a judge to consider the elements relating to the principle of tolerance, mentioned previously. A reference to a standard prescribed by legislation or regulation does not allow for the flexibility that should be permitted to properly qualify and recognize the rights and obligations of parties involved in litigation based on the terms of Article 982. From this point of view, general interest becomes a broader and more sensitive tool better suited to deal with the complex issues that will arise within the purview of the social objectives envisaged by the Legislature under the terms of Article 982.

This question is certainly open for further discussion.

D. Cases relating to “general interest” under Article 982.

The first case to be mentioned is Assoc. des résidents du Lac Mercier Inc. v. Québec (ministre de l’Environnement). This case involves a suit instituted by residents seeking to obtain the demolition of a converted railway right of way because of its alleged polluting effect on a nearby lake. The right of way has been developed into a linear park for use by different types of recreational vehicles.

Without attempting to first define general interest for the purposes of Article 982, the judge there simply stated:

[Author’s Translation] [The evidence before the Court would seem to indicate that] the tourist, recreational and economic benefits that result from the use of the old abandoned railway right of way for leisure purposes are significant. The general interest is undeniable. Under these circumstances, the Court has no hesitation to conclude that the general interest that the linear park serves greatly overrides any consideration of the ill-defined environmental damages that could be caused thereby to Lac Mercier.

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28. Which includes the determination of what constitutes a damage or injury that is beyond the “tolerable” threshold.
30. Id.
The only other case that deals with the question of applying the notion of general interest in an action under Article 982 is Roy v. Tring-Jonction. Roy, a dairy farmer, had access to a stream that bordered his farm and used the water from this stream to water his dairy cows. Upstream from Roy’s farm, the town of Tring-Jonction built a sewage treatment plant, partly with funds from the Québec Government, and had been given the necessary conformity certification by the Ministry of the Environment for the operation of the plant. However, effluent from this plant was highly contaminated; it polluted the stream, and as a result, Roy’s cows became very ill. One of them died.

Roy took action against the Town, which impleaded the Provincial authority. In his conclusions, Roy invoked the terms of Article 982 in order to obtain the demolition (no less) of the sewage treatment plant in addition to his claim for the damages sustained by his dairy farm.

The judge (François Pelletier), however, was sympathetic to the plight of this poor dairy farmer and granted part of the indemnification he claimed, but with respect to the notions of general interest, the judge took the traditional position that the Environment Quality Act, and the certificate issued thereunder, overrode any right he might have had under private law (in this case, Article 982 of the C.C.Q.):

[Author’s Translation] The certificate of compliance issued by the Ministry of the Environment enshrines the right of the municipality to pollute, to a certain extent and in the general interest, the streams that receive the overflow from its sewage system. In such a situation, the authorization granted by the terms of the certificate has precedence over the right given to the owner by the terms of Article 982 to require the destruction [of the plant].

I would like to suggest that the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in St. Lawrence Cement Inc. makes it more appropriate to adopt a broader interpretation of what constitutes general interest. In that case, the trial judge found that even though the defendant cement company was generally in compliance with applicable environmental legislation, this fact in itself did not absolve the defendant from liability for damages sustained by neighbours and resulting from the operation of the cement plant. These

findings were entirely relied upon and confirmed by the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada. One could certainly argue that in this case the general interest was not determined by reference to statutory enactments proceeding from the Legislature, but rather by the application of “common law” rules relating to the relation between neighbours, who are entitled to be indemnified, as a matter of general interest, taking into account questions of tolerance and injury that go beyond what would constitute “normal neighbourhood annoyances.”

E. Recent legislation

Maybe as a further indication that times are actually changing and that the notion of general interest is evolving, the adoption earlier this year of An Act to Affirm the Collective Nature of Water Resources and Provide for Increased Water Resource Protection provides an interesting source for the interpretation of general interest in the context of the preservation of water quality. Article 3 of this statute reads as follows:

*The protection, restoration, improvement and management of water resources are of general interest and further sustainable development. The Minister of Sustainable Development, Environment and Parks may take action to promote public access to the St. Lawrence River and other bodies of water or*

35. *Id.* ¶ 95.
After hearing the evidence, Dutil J. said she was convinced that, even though SLC had operated its plant in compliance with the applicable standards, the representatives and members of the group had suffered abnormal annoyances that were beyond the limit of tolerance neighbours owe each other according to the nature or location of their land. First, clinker dust or cement dust had caused the most serious annoyances in all the zones she had identified, namely the red, blue, yellow and purple zones. Because of the dust deposits, many residents had to wash their cars, windows and garden furniture frequently and could not enjoy their property. This led to considerable annoyances associated with maintenance and painting and with the use of outdoor spaces. As well, sulphur, smoke and cement odours caused abnormal annoyances in all zones except the purple zone. Finally, the noise from the cement plant’s operation caused annoyances that were beyond the limit of tolerance in the red zone and, to a lesser extent, in the blue zone. In view of Dutil J.’s findings of fact, it seems clear to us that the group members suffered abnormal annoyances that varied in their intensity but were beyond the limit of tolerance neighbours owe each other. The trial judge was therefore justified in finding SLC liable under art. 976 C.C.Q.

37. In the year 2009.
The general statement in the first sentence of Article 3 constitutes, in my estimation, a very clear reference to what may be comprised in the notion of general interest in this context. Transposing this interpretation to the introductory sentence of Article 982, we can see that the Legislature now clearly considers that the objectives of preventing pollution or depletion should normally be considered as forming an integral part of that concept so that in order to override the application of the remedies provided in Article 982, the burden that is imposed upon the polluter or on the person depleting the resource will be considerably heavier.

CONCLUSION

General interest clearly remains a dynamic concept, one that will continue to evolve as social, economic, and scientific needs and objectives evolve. With the current debate surrounding the impacts attributable to global warming, and as social values and needs change, our courts, who will remain the final arbiters in the specific situations brought before them, will play an equally dynamic and significant role. Clearly, an enlightened judiciary is what is called for here.

39. Id. at Art. 3 (emphasis added).