Beyond Brigham: How Supplemental Spending Undermines Vermont’s New School Funding Formula

Beyond Brigham: How Supplemental Spending Undermines Vermont’s New School Funding Formula

By Zane Buckminster

            In 1997, the Vermont Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Brigham v. State, holding that the state’s existing system of financing public education violated the Vermont Constitution.[1] The Court emphasized that educational opportunity could not be conditioned on local property wealth, because doing so entrenched inequality and denied students from poorer districts the same educational access as their peers in wealthier ones.[2] The Brigham decision became the foundation for Vermont’s equalization efforts in education finance, eventually leading to Acts 60 and 68, and now to Act 73, the newly adopted school funding reform.[3] While Act 73 is in many respects a positive step toward fairness, its provision for supplemental local spending represents a significant departure from Brigham’s vision. By allowing wealthier communities to layer additional resources onto their schools, the law undermines its own commitment to equality and risks reintroducing the very disparities Brigham sought to remedy.

            Act 73 was crafted in response to longstanding concerns about Vermont’s existing local control school finance model, which had become increasingly complex and unsustainable.[4] The law revises the state’s funding formula to better reflect the costs of educating students in districts with higher needs. Specifically, it weights student counts more heavily for factors such as poverty, English language learning, and rural location.[5] Act 73 thus acknowledges that equal funding does not always mean equal opportunity: some students require more resources to achieve comparable outcomes, and some schools face structural challenges that make providing education more expensive. This approach aligns with Brigham’s recognition that absolute equality in per-pupil spending is not always possible or desirable, as differences in expenditure may arise from legitimate educational needs.[6] Act 73 thus represents a serious effort to design a funding system that is more responsive, equitable, and constitutionally sound.

            However, Act 73’s allowance for supplemental local spending introduces a major flaw. Under the law, districts that wish to spend above the formula’s allocations may do so, provided their taxpayers are willing to shoulder the burden.[7] On the surface, this may seem like a harmless recognition of local choice and community investment. Yet in practice, it creates a pathway for wealthier districts to outspend others, not because of any legitimate educational cost differential, but simply because they have the financial capacity to do so. This move is in stark tension with Brigham, which cautioned against tying educational opportunity to income or wealth.[8] By reintroducing local discretion in this way, Act 73 risks repeating old mistakes in a new form.

            The Brigham Court was careful to note that differences in educational spending would persist even under a fair system, stating “differences among school districts in terms of size, special educational needs, transportation costs, and other factors will invariably create unavoidable differences in per‐pupil expenditures.”[9] But importantly, each of the reasons Brigham listed for spending variation is accounted for in Act 73’s new formula. Rural isolation is weighted, poverty is weighted, and other factors like English language learning are weighted.[10] These built-in adjustments ensure that when one district receives more state aid than another, the difference is grounded in actual educational needs, not in the accident of property wealth. The supplemental spending provision therefore stands apart from this logic. It does not exist to address any gap or need overlooked by the formula. Instead, it simply provides wealthier districts with an avenue to enhance their schools beyond the level of equity the system is designed to guarantee.

            This is where Act 73 undermines itself. On the one hand, it takes meaningful steps toward aligning Vermont’s education finance system with constitutional principles of equality. On the other hand, it simultaneously authorizes a mechanism that risks undoing this progress. If wealthy towns can regularly outspend others, students in those communities will enjoy smaller class sizes, broader course offerings, and more extracurricular opportunities. Meanwhile, students in less affluent districts will be confined to what the formula provides. While the baseline may be fairer than before, the overall system once again begins to resemble the tiered structure Brigham condemned—a base level of opportunity for all, supplemented by premium access for those fortunate enough to live in affluent areas.

            Defenders of the supplemental spending provision may argue that local autonomy and community investment are important values, and that denying districts the option to go above and beyond is unfair. Yet this argument overlooks the central insight of Brigham—that the Vermont Constitution obligates the state to provide substantially equal educational opportunity to all children, regardless of where they live.[11] Allowing supplemental spending privileges the preferences of wealthy taxpayers over the rights of children in poorer districts. It makes a child’s opportunities dependent once again on the resources of their town, which is precisely the inequity Brigham struck down.

            Ultimately, Act 73 represents both progress and regression. Its revised formula shows a sophisticated understanding of how to equalize resources while accounting for legitimate differences in cost. This is a major step forward for Vermont, and one that deserves recognition. But by preserving space for supplemental spending, the law opens the door to a two-tiered education system in which wealthier districts can consistently provide more than others. If Vermont is to fully honor the constitutional principles articulated in Brigham, it must close this loophole. Only by committing to a system where funding differences stem from educational needs rather than community wealth can the state ensure that every child, regardless of zip code, has a fair shot at the opportunities education provides.

[1] See Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 385 (Vt. 1997).

[2] Id. at 265, 396.

[3] Short History of Education Finance in Vermont, Vt. Legis. Joint Fiscal Off. (2021), https://ljfo.vermont.gov/assets/Meetings/Task-Force-on-the-Implementation-of-the-Pupil-Weighting-Factors-Report/2021-06-29/eaff3ab644/GENERAL-356877-v1-Short_History_of_Education_Finance_in_Vermont.pdf.

[4] Peter D’Auria, Scott Administration Projects ‘Unacceptable’ 18.5% Increase in Property Taxes, vtdigger (Nov. 30, 2023), https://vtdigger.org/2023/11/30/scott-administration-projects-unacceptable-18-5-increase-in-property-taxes/.

[5] An Act Relating to Transforming Vermont’s Education Governance, Quality, and Finance Systems, No. 73, Vt. Acts & Resolves 67-79 (2025).

[6] Brigham, 692 A.2d at 397 (Vt. 1997).

[7] An Act Relating to Transforming Vermont’s Education Governance, Quality, and Finance Systems, No. 73, Vt. Acts & Resolves 96 (2025).

[8] Brigham, 692 A.2d at 397 (Vt. 1997).

[9] Id.

[10] An Act Relating to Transforming Vermont’s Education Governance, Quality, and Finance Systems, No. 73, Vt. Acts & Resolves 67-79 (2025).

[11] Brigham, 692 A.2d at 397 (Vt. 1997).

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