By Dylan Chidick

I. The Promise of the CHOICE ACT

Restrictive covenants in employee contracts—especially non-compete agreements (NCAs)—have become a focal point in recent employment law debates. NCAs restrict an employee from taking on a role that competes with their current employer.[1] Critics claim these covenants suppress wages, hinder worker mobility, and reinforce employer protections.[2] In response, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a 2024 ruling banning NCAs for many workers.[3] Despite the FTC’s decision, Florida’s Contracts Honoring Opportunity, Investment, Confidentiality, and Economic Growth (CHOICE) Act moves in the opposite direction.

Florida enacted House Bill 1219, also known as the CHOICE Act, in 2025.[4] The Act does not eliminate Florida’s existing restrictive covenant law,[5] but rather adds a new employer-friendly rule that presumes the enforceability of noncompete and garden leave agreements for certain employees.[6] The Florida Legislature enacted this bill to protect business investments, promote training and knowledge sharing, and provide greater certainty for employers in a competitive market.[7] Specifically, it seeks to clarify enforceability and extend protections for employers.[8]

Under the Act, a “covered employee” is one whose salary exceeds twice the annual mean wage for the Florida county where (1) the employer’s principal place of business is located, or (2) if the employer is out of state, the county in Florida where the employee resides.[9] Although the wording seems neutral, using county-level mean wage data to determine employee coverage is problematic. Two counties—Miami-Dade and Liberty—demonstrate how the CHOICE Act’s county-based wage threshold results in unequal outcomes for similarly situated employees. The legislature should replace the county metric with a uniform statewide wage standard to promote fairness and consistency in how Florida regulates noncompete agreements.

II. The Choice Act Creates Incidental Problems

A. Unequal Coverage by County

Consider two Florida workers, both earning $100,000 annually in similar roles. In 2024, Miami-Dade’s average annual wage was roughly $79,000.[10] Two times this amount is approximately $158,000—meaning the CHOICE regime does not cover this worker. In Liberty County, the average annual wage was roughly $48,150.[11] The threshold is approximately $96,000, making the same $100,000 earner a “covered employee” subject to up to four years of noncompete restrictions. Thus, employees with identical roles can face significantly different post-employment limits based on their geographic location. By tying legal exposure to local wage data, the CHOICE Act effectively turns county borders into determinants of worker rights.

B. Equal Protection Under State Law

Florida’s Constitution guarantees equal protection for its citizens and prohibits impairment of the obligations of contracts.[12] While the Court typically applies rational basis review to economic legislation,[13] it is difficult to see a logical link between a worker’s county wage averages and the Act’s legitimate interest in promoting trade and business within the state. This logical discrepancy also undermines Florida’s commitment to equal protection of all its citizens. Identical agreements will yield different outcomes across counties, undermining the aims the Act was designed to promote. The disparity falls hardest on workers in low-wage counties—those with fewer resources and who cannot afford to challenge employment contracts in court.[14]

C. Policy Consequences

In practice, the Act has at least three consequences. First, the Act deepens inequality. Rural and low-wage counties—those most in need of financial assurance—become subject to stricter noncompete rules. This process can concentrate economic advantages in more affluent regions while leaving struggling communities behind. Second, the Act permits employers to move their principal place of business to other counties, expanding their coverage under the Act. In a process analogous to forum shopping,[15] employers can expand coverage and suppress wages in lower-income areas. Third, the Act breeds ambiguity in an era of remote work; CHOICE never clarifies which county’s data applies when an employee resides in one location but performs services elsewhere. Together, these consequences undermine the Act’s stated goal of fostering statewide economic growth, instead entrenching existing disparities and limiting opportunities for the very workers and communities it claims to support.

III. A Statewide Standard for a Statewide Workforce

Florida can preserve the CHOICE Act’s legitimate aims while eliminating geographic inequity. The most effective reform is to replace the county mean wage test with a uniform statewide threshold.

A. Rationale for a Statewide Threshold

Currently, whether a worker is bound by a stricter noncompete depends not on the sensitivity of their position but on where they live. A statewide threshold—set as twice the statewide mean wage or a fixed salary cutoff (for instance, $100,000)—would preserve the Act’s intent to target higher-earning employees, while ensuring equal treatment across Florida’s 67 counties.

B. Advantages of Uniform Application

1. Equal Treatment: Every employee, regardless of geography, faces the same legal standard.
2. Predictability: Employers and workers avoid disputes over which county’s wage data applies, particularly for hybrid or remote employees. Predictability can also prevent overburdening court dockets, allowing for more efficient litigation.
3. Protection of Employer Interests: Employers still have tools to safeguard trade secrets and client relationships, ensuring all companies are on equal footing.

C. Implementation

The Legislature could amend the CHOICE Act to replace the county averages with the statewide mean wage, updated every two years by the Florida Department of Commerce (FloridaCommerce). Existing “covered” contracts could be grandfathered to minimize disruption, and courts should interpret the “principal place of business” provision flexibly to prevent abuse. This single statutory change would restore fairness and predictability without weakening employer protection.

Conclusion

Florida’s CHOICE Act attempts—but fails—to enforce restrictions on employees while promoting the economy. The primary issue is the Act’s reliance on county-specific wage data, which restricts the employment opportunities of certain employees. By coupling noncompete enforceability with local wage averages, the Act measures an employee’s worth to their zip code. This approach favors those in wealthier neighborhoods and disadvantages those in poorer areas, thereby limiting economic mobility. Reforming this Act with a statewide standard can bring consistency and fairness, while also protecting employer interests. Employers can still protect trade secrets, but employees now have more opportunities for economic mobility. This statewide baseline would reflect the realities of the modern workforce, where people are interconnected. Only with statewide standards can the Florida Legislature achieve its intended goal.

[1] Sneha Solanki, What Is a Noncompete Agreement?, Thomson Reuters (July 19, 2024), https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/blog/what-is-a-noncompete-agreement/.

[2] Matthew S. Johnson, Kurt J Lavetti & Michael Lipsitz, The Labor Market Effects of Legal Restrictions on Worker Mobility, NBER Working Paper No. 31929 1, 6, 16 (2023).

[3] See FTC Announces Rule Banning Noncompetes, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Apr. 23, 2024) https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/04/ftc-announces-rule-banning-noncompetes.  

[4] Fla. Stat. § 542.45 (2025).

[5] Fla. Stat. § 542.335 (2018).

[6] Fla. Stat.  §542.45(5)(e).

[7] Fla. Stat. § 542.42 (2025) (legislative findings).

[8] Id.

[9] Fla. Stat.  § 542.43(3) (2025).

[10] County Employment and Wages in Florida—Fourth Quarter 2024, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat., (June 10, 2025), https://www.bls.gov/regions/southeast/news-release/2025/countyemploymentandwages_florida_20250610.htm#QCEWFLTable2.xlsx (multiplying the average weekly salary by fifty).

[11] Id.

[12] See Fla. Const. art. I, §§ 2, 10.

[13] Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (holding state law regulating opticians did not violate the due process clause because economic regulations are presumed constitutional if plausible rational basis supports them).

[14] See Emery G Lee, Law Without Lawyers: Access to Civil Justice, 69 Univ. Miami L. Rev. 499, 502 (2015). (reporting median civil litigation costs of about US$15,000).

[15] Forum Shopping, Dictionary.com,  https://www.dictionary.com/browse/forum-shopping (last visited Jan. 7, 2026).